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Questions over the role of the IMF in the economic development and adjustment in 
developing countries have been the topic of intensive research and debate in recent years. 
Although most studies find that participation in an IMF program helps facilitate balance 
of payments adjustment, research in this area almost uniformly finds that growth is 
reduced at the same time (e.g. Bordo and Schwartz, 2000; Przeworski and Vreeland, 
2000). In this paper we emphasize that the evaluation of the benefits and costs of 
participating in IMF-sponsored stabilization programs is complicated by the fact that 
countries typically enter into an agreement with the IMF only when facing dire economic 
problems. We argue that the sample selection bias is mainly responsible for the common 
perception that real output growth declines because countries choose to participate in 
IMF programs. This article uses four recently developed “matching” statistical methods 
(e.g. Heckman et al., 1997 and 1998; Rubin and Thomas, 1992; and others), based on the 
“selection on observables” bias, to estimate the growth effects of IMF program 
participation. In contrast with the extant literature, none of the matching method results 
(nearest neighbor, strata, radius and regression-adjusted) find an adverse growth effect. 
Rather, there is some evidence of a positive impulse to economic growth when countries 
entering IMF programs are compared to the appropriate counter-factual (i.e. non-
participating countries with similar characteristics).   
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The relative value and effectiveness of participation in IMF-sponsored stabilization 
programs is the topic of intense debate in the academic literature and amongst 
policymakers (see Willett, forthcoming, for a review). This controversy seems especially 
heated for countries facing acute balance of payments problems and currency crises, as 
witnessed in 1997 in Korea, Indonesia and Thailand and elsewhere. Stiglitz (2000), for 
example, supports critics of the IMF who argue “…the IMF’s economic ‘remedies’ often 
make things worse—turning slowdowns into recessions and recessions into depressions.”  
This article focuses on a key aspect in evaluating IMF programs that has not been 
adequately addressed-- the decision of a country to apply for participation in an IMF-
sponsored program and the decision of the IMF to offer a loan are not random events. 
And if the participation decision is correlated with macroeconomic variables that are in 
turn correlated with output growth, then standard estimation techniques will yield a 
biased measure of the participation effect. Sample selection bias of this nature-- the 
measured effect reflecting systematic, unaccounted-for differences between countries that 
enter into and do not enter into IMF programs—is a serious problem since countries 
entering into IMF programs typically do so under very adverse economic conditions.  
Most studies find sizeable declines in output growth arising from participation in IMF 
programs (e.g. Bordo and Schwartz, 2000; Hutchison, 2002; Hutchison and Noy, 
forthcoming; Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000; Vreeland, 2003). This article investigates 
whether sample selection bias into IMF programs is an important factor behind the 
common perception and dominant research finding that entering into an IMF program 
generally lowers economic growth. To date, the literature on IMF program evaluation 
uses the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) as an additional explanatory variable in the program 
1 evaluation equation to explicitly account for sample selection bias. This methodology, 
developed by Heckman (1979) is designed to account for the “selection on 
unobservables” bias, but the results are typically weak in the IMF evaluation literature – 
not much change is observed in the participation coefficient and the IMR is generally 
insignificantly different from zero (e.g., Hutchison, 2002; Przeworski and Vreeland, 
2000).  
Selection bias, however, may be separated into a “selection on observables” as well 
as  “selection on unobservables,” and it is likely in some cases—such as evaluating the 
outcomes of IMF programs—that the bias arising from the former is much more severe. 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), for example, find that an unbalanced distribution 
of observables among participants and non-participants in a major US job training 
program was a much more important source of bias than the conventional selection 
problem. The method of matching was developed to help account for the estimation bias 
arising from the ‘selection on observables’ problem, and to date has mainly been applied 
in the medical and labor economics literature. (Persson, 2001, is an exception in applying 
matching methods to a macroeconomic data set investigating currency unions and trade 
growth). The basic idea is straightforward. Each participation observation is matched to a 
non-participation observation that has the same observed values of a vector of other 
characteristics that determine participation (X). Under certain standard assumptions, the 
difference in the observed outcome between the two matched observations is thus the 
program’s effect. As Heckman et al. (1997) state: “…simple balancing of observables in 
the participant and comparison group samples goes a long way toward producing a more 
effective evaluation strategy” (p. 607).  
2 We evaluate the growth effects of participation in IMF-sponsored stabilization 
programs using several recently developed matching methods designed to deal with 
sample selection bias based on observables. In particular, we use “nearest neighbor”, 
“radius” and “stratification” matching methods, as well as a “regression-adjusted 
matching” estimator suggested by Heckman et al. (1997)—all methods designed to 
account for the “selection on observables” approach that has heretofore been neglected in 
the literature on IMF program evaluation. We find that the nature of non-random 
participation is a central problem in the evaluation of IMF programs and, after rigorously 
control for the selection on observables bias (and obtaining unbiased estimates), we find 
that IMF-program participation is not associated with adverse real growth effects. Rather, 
there is some evidence- albeit not strong—that participation in an IMF program generally 
leads to a positive growth impulse when compared to the appropriate counter-factual (i.e. 
the non-participation group of countries with similar characteristics).  This result is 
completely at odds with the conventional view of the effects of IMF programs and may 
explain why countries routinely choose to participate in an IMF stabilization program if it 
were not in their best interests to do so.  
Section 2 discusses the matching methodology is more detail and its application to 
the problem at hand. Section 3 discusses the data—selection of the appropriate IMF 
programs, sample of countries, and variables used in the propensity score (likelihood of 
participating in an IMF program) and treatment effect (growth) equations. Section 4 
presents the preliminary empirical results—calculation of the propensity scores and 
estimation of the growth equations used for the regression-adjusted matching methods. 
3 Section 5 presents the main empirical results. Section 6 concludes the paper and 
compares the results with the existing literature.    
 
Section 2. Matching Methodology 
The advantage of matching methods is that they address non-random sample selection 
and, as a non-parametric statistical method, avoid strong assumptions about functional 
form.
1 To examine the average effect of IMF program participation on output growth we 
employ three matching algorithms--nearest neighbor, stratification and radius matching—
as well as two regression-adjusted matching estimates. These are different approaches to 
matching observations with similar characteristics except that one group participates in 
an IMF program and the other does not. Following the matching of observations, the 
difference in output growth between the two groups is measured. This is termed the 
“treatment effect”.  
In order to assess similarity among countries, we investigate a list of observable 
characteristics. One approach would be to match each participation observation to a non-
participation observation that has exactly the same observed values of a vector of other 
characteristics that determine participation (X). In macroeconomic studies, where the size 
of the sample is typically limited, this matching method is difficult or impossible to 
implement. Fortunately, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983 and 1985) have shown that, if the 
probability of participation – P(X) – is known then matching by P(X) instead of X is 
sufficient. This collapses the multidimensional problem of matching to one dimension 
based on the estimated probabilities or propensity scores and greatly simplifies the 
                                                           
1 See Persson (2001) for an excellent review of the methodology and an application with macroeconomic 
data. .  
4 procedure. Rubin and Thomas (1992) show that using an estimated probability of 
participation  , based on the list of observable characteristics, instead of P(X) still 
reduces selection-on-observables bias.  When countries have a similar propensity score, 
they are paired according to one of the three matching criteria, and the treatment effect is 
measured. The two steps to the matching method is to first estimate the propensity score 




The nearest neighbor approach matches each participation observation to the non-
participation observation that has the nearest propensity score. After each non-
participation observation is used it is ‘returned’ to the pool of non-participation 
observations. A simple average of the paired matches is then computed. The radius 
approach matches each participation observation to the average of all the non-
participation observations with propensity scores falling within a pre-specified radius 
from the propensity score of the participation observation.
2 An average of the difference 
is obtained with weighting according to the number of non-participation observations 
used in the construction of each matched pair. The stratification approach divides the 
sample into five groups (strata) based on their propensity scores. Within each strata, the 
average of the participation observations is matched with the average of the non-
participation observations. An average of the five strata, weighted by the number of 
participation observations in each one, is then calculated. 
The first two algorithms are implemented in Dehejia and Wahba (2002),  while a 
version of the third one is used by them to develop an algorithm for estimating the 
                                                           
2 In our case, and following Persson (2001), we chose a 0.05 radius so that each participation observation 
with an estimated propensity score ρ is matched with all the non-participation observations whose 
propensity scores (q) satisfies the condition ρ-0.05<q<ρ+0.05. 
 
5 propensity scores. All three are implemented in Persson (2001). In all three cases, 
weighted standard errors are constructed using weighted averages as is given in the 
appendix of Persson (2001). 
Rubin (1979) and Heckman et al. (1997, 1998) also implement a regression-adjusted 
matching estimator. While the previous matching methodologies do not impose any 
structure on the output growth equation, biases could result from omitted variables that 
are correlated with both the outcome (output growth) and treatment (participating in an 
IMF program). Both consistency and efficiency may be improved by implementing a 
regression-adjusted estimator. Rubin (1979) suggests that the output regression should 
contain all observations while Heckman et al. (1998) conclude that estimation using only 
the non-participation observations is preferable. We employ both methods. From these 
regressions we obtain the residuals for each country-year observation. These residuals are 
then used for our three matching algorithms.  
 
Section 3. Selection of IMF Programs and Data Description 
  The objective of this study is to evaluate the impact on output growth arising from 
participating in an IMF-sponsored stabilization program. To this end, we focus on the the 
two IMF facilities designed to meet short-run balance of payments stabilization-- Standby 
Arrangements (SBA) and the enhanced fund facility (EFF).
3 In general, Fund members 
can access credit tranches from the General Resources Account (GRA) either by means 
of IMF program arrangements or by means of “outright purchases.” Outright purchases 
are limited, typically, for the first 25% of the member’s quota and do not involve any 
                                                           
3 See Hutchison (2003) for a complete discussion of IMF programs.  
 
6 phasing or conditionality. Stand-by arrangements have been the main instrument through 
which members gain access to further credit tranches.
4 Stand By Arrangements (SBA) 
typically last for 12-18 months (the legal maximum is 3 years) and first tranche drawings 
do not require strict conditionality. Any drawings beyond the first tranche require both 
phasing out and stricter conditionality and are limited to 100% of quota annually (300% 
cumulatively together with the Extended Fund Facility, EFF, as discussed below). 
Repurchase obligations last about 3 ¼ - 5 years from the date of purchase.  
The Extended Fund Facility, established in 1974, provides somewhat longer-term 
financing to countries in need of structural economic reforms. EFF arrangements 
typically last for 3 years; phasing and conditionality are similar to the SBAs with an 
emphasis on longer-term structural reforms. Quota limits are identical to the SBAs while 
repurchases last much longer (4½ - 10 years). Both facilities are subject to the same rate 
of interest for repayments.
5 The Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF), introduced in 1997 
in the Korean stabilization program, aims to supplement resources made available under 
SBAs and the EFF in order to provide financial assistance for exceptional balance of 
payments difficulties. Penalty interest rates (increasing over time) and short repayment 
periods (1–1½ years) insure that these are taken only in exceptional circumstances.
6
  We use the SBA and EFF programs (and, for Korea in 1997, the new SRF 
program) as our definition of “IMF-supported stabilization programs” since these are the 
only programs clearly linked to short-term balance of payments adjustment. (There are no 
cases of SBA and EFF programs being approved in the same year in this data sample). 
                                                           
4 As the Articles of Agreement state, they were defined as “a decision by the Fund by which a member is 
assured that it will be able to make purchases from the General Resources Account in accordance with the 
terms of the decision during a specified period and up to a specified amount” (Article XXX (b)). 
5 Starting in 1989, the rate of charge was linked directly to the SDR interest rate, and adjusted weekly. 
7 By contrast with these programs, some Fund facilities are directed primarily toward 
structural reform and poverty reduction and are not included in our study.   
Middle-to-high income developing countries over 1975-97 are investigated since this 
group (twenty-five emerging market countries) is only eligible for short-run stabilization 
funds from the IMF and a broad set of macroeconomic data is available. This set of 
countries are not eligible for the IMF concessionary loan programs. A broad set of 
macroeconomic data availability is necessary to estimate the IMF-program participation 
and output growth equations with a sufficient number of control  variables.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 In our sample, the only such case is the agreement with Korea in 1997. 
8 Section 4. Preliminaries: Estimating Propensity Score and Output Growth Equations 
 
A. Propensity Scores 
In controlling for sample selection bias, a probit equation explaining the likelihood of 
IMF-program participation is estimated to calculate propensity scores. Our selection of 
potential variables is guided by previous literature in this area, especially Knight and 
Santaella (1997) who test a number of supply side (e.g. willingness of the IMF to approve 
programs) and demand side (e.g. demand of a particular country for IMF credits) 
determinants. This literature demonstrates that entering into an IMF agreement is not 
random, but guided by “…a clear set of observable economic factors that are strongly 
correlated with the event of approval of a financial arrangement.” (p. 431).  In particular, 
Knight and Santaella find that a low level of international reserves, low per capita GDP, 
high ratio of external debt service (to export earnings), movements in the real exchange 
rate, weak GDP growth and a low rate of domestic investment induce countries to seek an 
IMF-supported program. Policy measures to enhance fiscal revenues, reduce government 
expenditures, to tighten domestic credit, and to adjust the exchange rate are significant 
factors likely to win IMF approval of programs.  
We are interested in a reliable prediction equation, and therefore estimate a reduced 
form equation rather than identify separately the determinants of the supply and demand 
of IMF programs. In addition to the variables noted above, we investigate whether 
(lagged) foreign exchange reserves to imports ratio, the change in the current account to 
GDP ratio, and real per capita GDP growth are reliable predictors of IMF-program 
9 participation. These macroeconomic data series are taken from the International 
Monetary Fund’s IFS CD-ROM.   
  The results are shown in table 1. Countries with high foreign debt and facing a 
currency or balance-of-payments crisis are more likely to enter into an IMF program. 
Countries with improving fiscal positions and higher foreign exchange reserves (relative 
to imports) are less likely to enter into IMF programs. The model correctly predicts  over 
80 percent of the 412 observations, where a correct prediction is defined as a propensity 
score of over (less than) 50 percent corresponding with IMF-program participation (non-
participation). Other lagged values were investigated but did not add explanatory power 
to the model. 
 
B. Output Growth Equations 
In order to implement Rubin (1979) and Heckman et al.’s (1997, 1998) regression-
adjusted matching estimators, it is necessary to first specify an equation that controls for 
the factors—other than IMF program participation—that may influence the evolution of 
GDP growth. To this end we employ a benchmark model based on a reduced form 
equation, derived in turn from an output equation and a policy reaction function, termed 
the General Evaluator Estimator by Goldstein and Montiel (1986). Recent applications of 
this framework include Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000), Hutchison (2003) and Hutchison and 
Noy (2003). A complete description of the basic model, model derivation, and definitions 
of the explanatory variables may be found in Hutchison (2003).  
The dependent variable estimated is the difference in the real GDP growth rate. The 
explanatory variables in the model are contemporaneous external output growth rates, 
10 contemporaneous and lagged currency crises; lagged values for the change in the budget 
surplus to GDP ratio, inflation rates, credit growth, real exchange rate overvaluation, real 
GDP growth; and dummy variables for Asia and Latin America.  
The indicator of currency and balance of payments crises is constructed from “large” 
changes in an index of currency pressure, defined as a weighted average of monthly real 
exchange rate changes and monthly (percent) reserve losses.
7 Following convention (e.g. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) the weights are inversely related to the variance of 
changes of each component over the sample for each country. An episode of severe 
exchange rate pressure is defined as a value in the index—a threshold point-- that exceeds 
the mean plus 2 times the country-specific standard deviation, provided that it also 
exceeds 5 percent.
8 The first condition insures that any large (real) depreciation is 
counted as a currency crisis, while the second condition attempts to screen out changes 
that are insufficiently large in an economic sense relative to the country-specific monthly 
change of the exchange rate. For each country-year in our sample, we construct binary 
measures of currency crises, as defined above (1 = crisis, 0 = no crisis).  
The external growth rate measure is the trade-weighted average growth rate of the 
country’s major trading partners. Real exchange rate overvaluation is defined as 
deviations from a fitted trend in the real trade weighted exchange rate. The real trade-
weighted exchange rate is the trade-weighted sum of the bilateral real exchange rates 
(defined in terms of CPI indices) against the U.S. dollar, the German mark, and the 
Japanese yen. The trade-weights are based on the average bilateral trade with the United 
                                                           
7 Our currency pressure measure of crises does not include episodes of defense involving sharp rises in 
interest rates. Data for market-determined interest rates are not available for much of the sample period in 
many of the developing countries in our dataset. 
11 States, the European Union, and Japan in 1980 and 1990. Definitions of the other 
variables are conventional. 
We use annual observations in our analysis. While we employ monthly data for our 
(real) exchange rate pressure index to identify currency crises and date each by the year 




Section 5. Real Output Effects of IMF Programs using Matching Methods 
 
A. Trimmed Regression Estimates 
As a preliminary analysis, we compare the standard GEE approach to estimating the 
effects of IMF-program participation (using an unrestricted sample) to that with a sample 
“trimmed” by discarding those observations that are outside the common support of the 
participating and non-participating observations. The basic idea is to exclude those 
observations where a country, in a particular year, is either very likely or very unlikely to 
participate in an IMF program. Using the propensity scores, matched against actual 
program participation, the common support criteria involves excluding 55 non-
participation observations that have very low estimated propensity scores (<0.079) and 4 
participation observations that have the highest estimated propensity scores (>0.82).  
The first column of Table 3 reports the standard GEE regression using the 
unrestricted sample. The baseline model follows Hutchison (2002), and explains output 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8Other studies also define the threshold of large changes in terms of country-specific moments. While the 
choice of cut-off point is somewhat arbitrary, Frankel and Rose (1996) suggest that the results are not very 
12 growth as a function of a number of control variables and an IMF participation dummy 
variable (coded one if the country in question was in an IMF program at a given year). 
The estimate on the IMF dummy indicates that output growth is reduced by 68 
percentage points for each year of program participation. This compares with a reduction 
of 78 percentage points, reported in Hutchison (2003) and Hutchison and Noy (2003), for 
a broader sample of developing countries. This estimate is similar in magnitude to 
Conway (1994), and substantially less than the output loss estimated by Bordo and 
Schwartz (2000) and Przeworski and Vreeland (2000).  
The second column of Table 3 reports estimates from the trimmed sample, based on 
the propensity scores as an exclusionary criteria. The coefficient estimate on the IMF 
dummy drops in absolute value to –0.38 and is no longer statistically significant at 
conventional levels. This result suggests that the previously estimated negative effect of 
IMF programs may be the result of selection-on-observables bias and not from adverse 
effects from IMF-program participation.   
  
B. Unconditional Matching Results 
The second part of the analysis utilizes nearest neighbor, radius and strata matching 
methods to evaluate the effects of IMF programs. These results are shown in table 4. The 
propensity scores are derived from the probit equations. We term these results 
“unconditional matching” since the mean values of output growth are compared for the 
participating and non-participating observations, i.e. differences in output growth are not 
conditioned on any explanatory factors. Panel A presents the results of differences in 
output growth one year following the approval of the IMF program. Panel B presents the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sensitive to the precise cut-off chosen in selecting crisis episodes. 
13 results comparing the difference in average output growth for three years following the 
approval of the IMF program.   
None of the results point to any significant differences in output growth performance 
between IMF program participation and non-participation. Output growth is higher for 
IMF-participation observations using the nearest neighbor (1.31-1.85 percent) and radius 
methods (0.77 percent), though not statistically significant at conventional levels, and 
virtually identical using the strata matching method. Though not statistically significant at 
conventional levels, it is interesting that most of the results show “large” and positive 
growth effects from participating in IMF programs—with the largest positive one-year 
effect being an increase of output by 1.3 percentage points. This is weak statistical 
evidence of a positive effect of IMF programs, but is noteworthy given the contrast with 
the extant literature, and lack of statistical significance in not unexpected since the 
matching procedure discards many observations (see Persson, 2001, for a discussion).  
 
C. Regression-adjusted Matching Estimators 
The next matching method employed compares differences in “conditional” output 
growth, i.e. the residuals from output growth equations shown in table 2 using all the 
observations (Rubin method) and using only non-program observations (Heckman 
method). These regressions explain output growth using the standard control variables, 
and the residuals (“unexplained output growth”) is compared for program participation 
and non-participation observations using the three matching methods. These results are 
shown in table 5 for output growth based on the Rubin method and in Table 6 for the 
Heckman method. Panel A (in both tables) presents the difference in output growth for 
14 the year following the IMF program, Panel B presents the difference in growth rate 
differences between program and non-program observations, and Panel C presents the 
difference in average growth rates for the three years following the IMF program.  
In no case are the differences (or difference in differences) statistically significant, 
but most are positive. There is no evidence that the impact of an IMF program is 
negative.  
 
Section 6. Conclusion 
Most studies find that the estimated cost of an IMF stabilization program, in terms 
of foregone output growth, is about 0.7-2.5 percentage points during each year of 
program participation. This paper argues that the issue of sample selection bias has not be 
adequately addressed in this literature and proposes several trimming and matching 
methods using propensity scores to investigate whether there is a significant difference in 
growth performance between years of IMF program participation and non-participation.  
The first part of the analysis considers a standard output regression used in the 
literature (“baseline model”) to analyze the effects of IMF program participation. The 
standard result is obtained, suggesting that IMF program participation is associated with 
low output growth. The baseline model is compared with an identical model other than 
the sample of observations was “trimmed” to exclude those observations where a country 
was either very likely or very unlikely to participate in an IMF program. These results do 
not suggest any reduction in output growth for those countries participating in an IMF 
program. The second and main part of  the analysis uses alternative forms of matching 
methods to investigate the difference in output performance between participation and 
15 non-participation in IMF programs. There is no evidence that IMF program participation 
imposes output costs on countries. Rather, most estimates indicate a positive though 
statistically insignificant output growth effect from participation in IMF programs.  
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18      Table 1 - Probit Equation for Estimating Propensity Scores 
       Dependent Variable: onset of short-term IMF programs  
Capital Formation  -0.016 
(0.87) 
  
Debt to GDP Ratio  1.162*** 
(3.10) 
  
Debt Service to Imports Ratio  -0.021* 
(1.92) 
  
Change in budget surplus to GDP ratio (t-1)  -5.863* 
(1.78) 
  
Foreign Exchange to Imports Ratio (t-1)  -0.640* 
(1.73) 
  
Other IMF programs (t)  -0.025 
(1.42) 
  
Currency crises dummy (t)  0.750*** 
(3.20) 
  
Asia Dummy  -0.121 
(0.17) 
  
Latin America dummy  0.124 
(0.20) 
  
Observations  413    
Chi Squared  110.28    
Percent of Correctly Predicted Observations  81    
 
 
19 Table 2 - Growth Equations for Estimating Residuals  






  Rubin Residuals 
(all observations) 




























































Observations 371    455 
Adjusted R2 0.54   0.48 
Estimated correlation of error terms  0.05   0.02 
 
20  
Table 3 - Growth Equations with Trimmed Sample 
 









Change in budget surplus to GDP ratio (t-1)  5.252 7.653 
Inflation Rate (t-1)  -0.028*** -0.039** 
Credit growth (t-1)  0.024*** 0.038*** 
External growth rates (t)   0.261** 0.229 
Real exchange rate overvaluation (t-1)  -0.047*** -0.033** 
Short-term IMF program dummy (t)  -0.680* -0.383 
Currency crises dummy (t-1)  -2.253*** -2.060*** 
Currency crises dummy (t)  -2.887*** -2.702*** 
Interactive dummy (CC t or t-1 and IMF at t)    
Real GDP growth (t-1)  -0.819*** -0.812*** 
Latin America dummy  -0.814 -1.111 
Asia dummy  1.192** 0.945 
Observations  455 236 
Adjusted R2
0.48 0.48 







A.  Unconditional Output Growth in Program Year 
 






1.31 0.44  -0.14 
t-statistics 
  1.46 0.72  0.20 
Number of 
observations  154 254  254 
 
 
B.  Unconditional Output Growth in 3 Years following Program 
 






1.85 0.86  -0.06 
t-statistics 
  1.05 0.77  0.04 
Number of 
observations  140 216  216 
 
22 Table 5  
Matching Rubin Residuals 
A. Conditional Output Growth in Program Year 
(Rubin Regression Residuals) 
 






0.29 -0.01  0.09 
t-statistics 
  1.25 0.04  0.50 
Number of 
observations  142 236  236 
 
 
B.  Conditional Output Growth in Program Year 
(Diff-Diff Rubin Regression Residuals) 
 






0.13 -0.13  -0.11 
t-statistics 
  0.43 0.64  0.47 
Number of 
observations  134 229  229 
 
 
C.  Conditional Output Growth in 3 Years following Program 
(Rubin Regression Residuals) 
 






0.31 0.36  0.17 
t-statistics 
  0.80 1.58  0.57 
Number of 
observations  116 188  188 
23 Table 6 
Matching Heckman Residuals 
A.  Conditional Output Growth in Program Year 
(Heckman Regression Residuals) 
 






-0.53 0.31  0.01 
t-statistics 
  0.62 0.57  0.01 
Number of 
observations  138 236  236 
 
 
B.  Conditional Output Growth in Program Year 
(Diff-Diff Heckman Regression Residuals) 
 






-0.19 0.32  0.69 
t-statistics 
  0.14 0.44  0.77 
Number of 
observations  138 229  229 
 
C.  Conditional Output Growth in 3 Years following Program 
(Heckman Regression Residuals) 
 






-1.20 =1.36  -0.57 
t-statistics 
  0.84 -1.60  0.52 
Number of 
observations  116 188  188 
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